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Exploring the Social and Organisational Aspects of Human Factors Integration: 
A Framework and Case Study 
 
 
Abstract 
 
In this paper we first outline a framework which aims to capture some of the social 
and organisational aspects of Human Factors Integration (HFI) which have been 
outlined by previous research.  The framework was partly used to design a set of 
interview questions that were used with a case study of a human factors team working 
with the UK defence industry. The findings from the case study revealed a number of 
barriers which accord with previous research in the domain of HFI (e.g., attitudes and 
perceptions towards HF), as well as providing insights into the improvement 
strategies used by the HF team in order to improve HFI. These included attempts to 
build relationships and establish a working rapport with other groups in the company, 
as well as other activities aimed at addressing the organisational culture within the 
company as a whole (e.g., attempts to raise the profile of HF within the company). We 
use the framework for social and organisational aspects of HFI to discuss our findings 
alongside other research on group behaviour and boundary management within large 
organisations. The conclusions of the paper point to the utility of the framework as a 
means of planning HFI improvement strategies which can help to overcome some of 
the social and organisational barriers to HFI. 
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1. Introduction 
Accounts of the problems involved in applying human factors within industry have a 
long history and date back to some of the earliest examples of research and practice 
within human factors and ergonomics (Meister, 1999; Chapanis, 1999; Waterson and 
Sell, 2006). Over the years a number of authors have pointed to a range of problems 
and barriers that underpin the relationship between human factors practitioners and 
their industrial counterparts. In particular, the work of David Meister and colleagues 
during the 1960’s, 70’s and 80’s has addressed these issues in depth. Meister and Farr 
(1967) for example, found that designers and engineers had little or no interest in 
human factors, partly since human factors information was perceived as being too 
inaccessible as compared to charts, graphs and tables.  Later work during the 1970s 
and early 1980s (Meister 1982a,b) sought out the views of engineers, research 
contractors and government personnel regarding human factors. One of the main 
conclusions from this research that individuals were not convinced of the value of 
human factors and were inadequately trained in the use of HF tools and methods. 
 
In his analysis of the influence of organisational context on the work of human factors 
engineers (HFEs), Charles Perrow (1983) argued that the relative weak position and 
low profile of the HFE within the context of the larger organisation in which they are 
employed, served to undermine the value and impact of their work. Various other 
explanations for this type of phenomenon can be given, including the differences in 
terms of “mindsets” and values which exist between HFEs and colleagues drawn from 
other disciplines and backgrounds (e.g., social science as compared to engineering – 
Cullen, 2007). In addition, many have pointed to the high costs of inputs from human 
factors into the design process and HF assessments and evaluations (Beevis, 2003; 
Kerr et al., 2008).  
 
1.1 Human Factors Integration (HFI) 
In the last few years the drive toward improving the uptake of human factors within 
industry has led to the development of initiatives to support human factors integration 
(HFI). Newman and Tatlock (2004) report the outcomes of a workshop held with HFI 
practitioners from industry in order to ascertain the types of barriers that exist when 
applying HFI within system design. The workshop generated over 190 
recommendations and covered a range of issues including the provision of “help 
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desk” facilities to help manage the HFI process, the need for better structured tools 
and methods for the identification of HFI issues and methods for quantifying the costs 
and benefits of HFI. Similarly, the report highlighted the importance of organisational 
factors such as culture and attitudes amongst system designers in shaping the 
outcomes of HFI initiatives. 
 
Much of the research that has been carried out on HFI has focused on the 
development of method and tool development (Newman et al., 2008; MacLeod, 
2008). Similarly, others have focused on the need to develop cogent arguments for 
cost justification of HFI (Bruseberg, 2008). Little recent work has concentrated in 
detail on the social and organisational “process issues”, namely: the day-to-day work 
of HF teams; their interaction with other groups; communication problems and 
barriers; and, the influence of large-scale extrinsic factors such as organisational 
culture. 
 
In the next section of the paper we describe the framework for understanding the 
social and organisational aspects of HFI. The framework brings together previous 
research on the organisational constraints on HFI (e.g., Perrow, 1983), as well as other 
research which has examined the components of effective team working within 
organisations (e.g., Antoni and Hertel, 2009; Sundstrom, DeMeuse and Futrell, 1990). 
The framework was partly used to design an interview schedule that was used with a 
case study of the social and organisational aspects of HFI (sections 3 and 4). In the 
discussion section of the paper (section 5) we use the framework to shed further light 
on the findings from the case study, as well as considering the wider implications of 
these findings for future research on HFI. 
 
2. A framework for understanding the social and organisational aspects of HFI 
The work of human factors teams within organisations can be seen as being 
influenced by a range of factors which cut across organisational, team and individual 
levels of analysis. At the wider organisational level, reward systems, the structural 
characteristics of the organisation and it’s cultural values will play a role in how they 
operate (Schein, 2005). We know from previous work on HFI for example, that the 
work of the HF team is often marginalised and their role in the business of the 
organisation may be seen as unimportant or peripheral (Perrow, 1983).  
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The effectiveness with which they function as a team within the organisation is 
sometimes seen as consisting of two main dimensions: team performance and team 
viability (Hackman, 1987; Sundstrom, DeMeuse and Futrell, 1990). Team 
performance refers to the degree to which the work team meets standards given by 
supervisors or customers within or outside the wider organisation. In the context of a 
HF team this might mean the degree to which the team is seen as providing support to 
the design process or supporting the large business goals within the organisation. 
Team viability refers to extent that collaboration between members of  the team an 
other groups within the organisation is sustained over time. In this case, this might 
refer to how likely the involvement of the HF team in projects is likely to extend 
beyond short-term project work and progress into longer-term collaborations within 
the organisation. 
 
Finally, at an individual level of analysis attitudes and mindsets regarding the value of 
HF and its role in the design progress are likely to shape the way in which the HF 
team work within the organisation (Meister 1982 a, b). Figure 1 shows a diagram of 
how these organisational, team and individual levels of analysis relate to one another, 
alongside examples of social and organisational barriers preventing effective HFI. 
 
 
 
Figure 1 about here 
 
 
 
 
2.1 Study aims and objectives 
The framework is used in part to probe deeper into the social and organisational 
aspects of HFI using a case study of a human factors team working within an 
industrial, defence-based context. Specifically, the aims of the paper are threefold: 
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• To examine in detail an industrial case study of the social and organisational 
processes that shape the work of a human factors team and their relationship with 
colleagues from other disciplines; 
• To describe the main barriers, problems and enables of the work of the human 
factors team and compare this with previous research on HFI. 
• To interpret the findings from the case study in terms of the social and 
organisational aspects of HFI framework described earlier.  
 
 
 
3. Method 
3.1 Setting and team characteristics 
The study took place within a division of a large engineering company based within 
the UK. The main business of the company division is taken up with defence 
applications and the application of human factors design assessment and evaluation 
techniques. The human factors team work in close partnership with contractors from 
the defence industry, as well as engineers and other personnel responsible for safety 
employed by the company. The team is comprised of approximately 8 members and is 
well established within the company, having been in existence for over ten or so 
years. Membership of the team is relatively stable and their role in the company is 
clearly defined in terms of operational procedures. The activities of the human factors 
team corresponds to the definition of a “work team” as described by Cohen and 
Bailey (1987), in that they are charged with performing tasks associated with the core 
activities of the company (e.g., evaluating the safety of defence equipment and putting 
forward suggestions for improvements to design). The work of team often involves a 
small number of the 8 members working on project work. In other cases the team may 
be tasked as a whole to work on longer-term project work. Due to the confidential 
nature of the work conducted by the team we have disguised references to specific 
projects, as well as other details of their work which would have compromised their 
anonymity. 
 
3.2 Participants and recruitment 
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A total of 20 interviews were carried out during June and July 2007.  Five participants 
were members of the human factors team: six were employed as engineering 
designers; six participants worked as safety engineers. The remaining three 
participants worked as engineers within the company with varying responsibilities, 
company experience and roles  (e.g., Head of Engineering Division) – table 1.  
 
 
 
Table 1 here 
 
 
 
A list of potential participants for the study was provided by the Human Factors Team 
Leader and subsequently contacted by one of the researchers by email in order to 
arrange dates and times for interview. A purposive sampling strategy was used in 
order to ensure that a representative sample of company roles (e.g., managers and 
team leaders) and disciplines took part in the study (e.g., human factors team 
members, design engineers). The interviews lasted between 30 minutes to 1 hour. In 
addition, a number of participants were later contacted by email in order to clarify 
material derived from the interview, as well as to give them the opportunity for further 
comments. 
 
3.3 Interview schedule 
A semi-structured interview schedule was drawn up and based upon the findings from 
previous research examining the barriers and enablers to successful human factors 
integration. In this context we define a barrier as an “obstacle or agency that prevents 
the integration of HF into project work”. The term enabler, by contrast we take to 
refer to “something that eases or supplies the means to bring about the integration of 
HF into project work”. Both definitions are based on those provided by the most 
recent edition of the Oxford English Dictionary (11th edition, 2008). A draft of the 
schedule was piloted with members of the human factors team. The final interview 
schedule was made up of the following sections: the professional background of the 
interviewee; experiences with human factors and human factors techniques; opinion 
of the role of human factors in the design process; experiences of 
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successful/unsuccessful human factors integration; reasons why the company may not 
involve human factors in design; the role played by human factors more generally 
within the company and attitudes within the company towards human factors; and, 
future challenges for human factors within the company and suggestions how these 
could be improved or facilitated. 
 
 
3.4 Data Analysis 
All of the interviews were recorded using a digital recorder and manually transcribed 
into Microsoft Word documents. The data was then inputted into the NVivo (version 
7) qualitative data analysis software package. Template analysis (King, 1998; 
Crabtree and Miller, 1999) was used to further examine and develop codes using a set 
of a priori codes based upon data within the headings and sub-heading in the 
interview schedule. Once the a priori codes had been defined they were subsequently 
applied to the whole dataset. During the second phase of data analysis the original 
codes were reanalysed and a number of additional themes and sub-themes emerged 
from the data. This process followed the guidelines outlined by Miles and Huberman 
(1994) and resulted in a final coding scheme (table 2). 
 
 
 
Table 2 here 
 
 
 
4. Results 
4.1 The work and role of the human factors team  
Much of the work of the human factors team is mandatory, in the sense that projects 
are required to have human factors input due to legal and safety considerations: 
 
“There is a split in our human factors integration … You must have human factors 
input, which is good because obviously everybody in the project knows that human 
factors integration must happen” (Human Factors Team Member) 
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In other cases there is a degree of flexibility, whereby the team, may be called into 
projects on an informal basis and their opinion sought on a variety of issues relating to 
human factors: 
 
“It could be anything from a couple of hours to attend a meeting to providing human 
factors or specialist expertise, right the way through to a year to two-year project … 
(Human Factors Team Leader) 
 
A distinction can be drawn between examples of the work of the team where they 
have been “pulled” into projects through an external request and other instances 
where the team actively “pushes” themselves into projects. Frequent examples of the 
“pull” aspects of the work of the team involve information provision, often in the 
form of anthropometric, human reliability and other forms of HF data: 
 
“Within our organisation the human factors team are kind of data suppliers to our 
safety work. We carry out a risk model which obviously has questions based on the 
user.  We ask for the information from the human factors team, which is generally 
human reliability assessment data” (Safety Engineer) 
 
The team also actively attempts to “push” HF into design and raise the awareness of 
other project members of the need to consider HF when carrying out design activities: 
  
“It could be sometimes that we suggest someone has human factors.  For example, 
[posing a rhetorical question] do you realise that there is a lot of human factors in 
there? Sometimes the external customer will then contact us.” (Human Factors Team 
Leader) 
 
This strategy has met with some success and has led to a growing awareness of the 
work of the team and the benefits of their involvement: 
 
“People will request your help, invariably because they have got some awareness of 
ergonomics and human factors or they have seen the project where human factors and 
ergonomics input has had some positive effect and are not necessarily aware of what 
that input is and where it should come from, or the nature of the activity involved.” 
(Human Factors Team Member) 
 
External perceptions of the role of team varied across a few dimensions, most 
comments viewed the team as a fundamental part of the business activity of the 
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company. Part of this was interpreted as maintaining quality in terms of safety 
compliance or risk mitigation: 
 
“It ensures that … you don’t have the risk of having to do potentially significant 
rework because the delivered product isn’t what the customer was looking for … 
getting HF involved is to some extent derisking the eventual delivery.” (Safety 
Engineer) 
 
The comments of the Head of Engineering reinforce the view that human factors is 
perceived as part of the core business of the company. The human factors team are not 
seen as separate, or peripheral to engineering, but rather as an integrated component: 
 
“It's more to do with implementing systems standards, rather than analyzing a human 
factors situation…In [the company] we treat human factors as just another 
engineering skill.” (Head of Engineering) 
 
4.2 Social and organisational factors influencing HFI 
4.2.1 Company culture 
The culture within the company was seen as one of the factors that acted as an 
impediment to the work of the human factors team. Part of this related to 
communication problems:  
 
“Why organizations might not use or utilise human factors? - It would be down to 
lack of understanding, a lack of communication or perception, that it is too expensive 
or too time-consuming. (Human Factors Team Member) 
 
In other cases there existed a shared lack of understanding of what was covered by the 
work of the team: 
 
“I really think most managers don't understand it, some engineers do, but not many.” 
(Head of Engineering) 
 
 
An additional problem was that although the human factors team had been in 
existence for a number of years and had an established track record within the 
company, it still lacked visibility and prominence within the overall organizational 
structure: 
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“I think HF is always seen as the sort of fluffy bolt on part of the project design. It’s 
relatively new in that its been around for many years …it can sometimes be seen as a 
bubble on a flow diagram of an organisational chart.” (Safety Engineer) 
 
The lack of high profile of the team acts as a further barrier in terms of integrating 
their work within engineering, as well as extending the scope of their work into new 
areas: 
 
“… a major lesson learned is to get HF personnel integrated … Is that a shared view 
across the organisation?  … I think not, I think that there are a number of project 
managers and senior engineers out there who understand probably the same position 
as myself, but I think there is another group who may not even know that they exist to 
be honest.” (Safety Engineer). 
 
 
 
4.2.2 Relationships 
Respondents frequently mentioned the nature of relationships between the human 
factors team and their colleagues as one of the most important factors in achieving 
successful HFI in projects. Building a relationship and maintaining good relations 
with project members initially involved getting over skepticism and to some extent 
mistrust of the value of HF: 
 
“It's nice to see in the beginning when people ask “what are you all about?” By the 
time you’ve explained it to them and done the projects, they can see the benefits.  Now 
they seek human factors guidance rather than being forced to.” (Human Factors 
Team Member) 
 
 
Building the relationship took time and over the course of the last few years attitudes 
towards the work of the team have improved: 
 
“Initially, everyone thought that it was a complete waste of time because they didn’t 
see the point of it.  But obviously, as time goes on you certainly see the benefits.” 
(Safety Engineer) 
 
 12 
Improved relationships have evolved to the extent that HF involvement and the 
benefits of making use of the expertise of the team, has been established amongst 
many people as a norm within the Company: 
 
“It's very clear that human factors is a major part of our business.  This has only 
really risen up over the last three to five years, and I think it is was there, but was a 
little bit dormant.  Nowadays,  it is recognized” (Safety Engineer). 
 
In some cases, respondents expressed the opinion that whole-scale integration of HF 
activities with engineering and design had been achieved: 
 
“There is really no difference in what we do and what the human factors people 
provide. We are all one team essentially, whatever engineer you are, we are all the 
same.” (Safety Engineer) 
 
 
Establishing a rapport with other disciplines outside of HF and building on this during 
project work, involved a variety of actions on the part of the human factors team. 
These included being proactive, supportive and maintaining a positive attitude toward 
working in multidisciplinary teams: 
 
“One of the biggest things that I've learnt about human factors integration here is 
that you have to work with other disciplines, work effectively with other disciplines for 
the human factors integration part … build up on that rapport and the movement of 
information, being clear on what the software engineer or the hardware engineer are 
trying to achieve.” (Human factors Team Member) 
 
In some cases it might also mean trying to understand the needs of other colleagues 
and adopting their point of view: 
 
“It is basically important to understand the context of the project and try to go on 
from there and be quite proactive. If you show enthusiasm and pump a few more ideas 
into the process … they will be quite forthcoming with you.  It's also about building a 
rapport as well” (Human Factors Team Member) 
 
 
Maintaining the relationship also required persistence and determination: 
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“I’ve seen some thorough hard work by the human factors people over the years and 
they demonstrate and provide valuable input, but it's not necessarily a natural joining 
together of the technical people and the actual human factors people. It has to 
continually be propagated by the human factors side” (Safety Engineer). 
 
The friendliness of the team and approachability was singled out as reasons 
underpinning successful relationships and helped to cement these together: 
 
“The human factors team are very, very friendly people and easy to know. I think 
people like [name] must have the patience of  a saint to have the courage to run 
human factors and handle the criticisms and grief from the other side.” (Safety 
Engineer) 
 
The approachability of the team acted as a way of opening up channels of 
communication: 
 
“The HF people are very open approachable lot, they were forthcoming with the 
answers and there’s a lot of two way communication.” (Design Engineer) 
 
4.2.3 Learning 
One of the processes that has led to greater integration of HF within engineering 
projects has been through mutual learning. Human factors team members and 
colleagues from other disciplines have learnt to appreciate and value their different 
roles and viewpoints on design issues: 
 
“I think it was basically a learning process from both sides, the design engineer’s 
understanding what the human factors people had to do, and likewise the human 
factors people understanding what the designers had to do.” (Development Engineer) 
 
 
Part of this mutual learning has involved appreciation of the differences that exist 
between the goals and viewpoints of human factors team members and other 
disciplines: 
 
“There’s a mixed aspect to the relationship, I think its positive in that human factors 
drives towards having a better design, and I think the negativity comes from where 
human factors obviously wants to do a full job when they look at things. They want to 
be quite thorough, whereas the management of the design team probably want to get 
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a maximum return of what they can get but in a small space of time and money so they 
aren't using too much budget.” (Design Engineer) 
 
“I think it's quite a good attitude now, there’s none of this ‘here we go human factors 
is now coming in to stop us’. I also think that as a designer, we might not always 
appreciate the environment that the operator works in, so human factors can be our 
saviour at times.” (Design Engineer) 
 
 
4.2.4 Communication and mutual understanding 
Communication and problems of communication were mentioned by respondents as 
factors that determined the success of HF integration within the company. In some 
cases, respondents pointed to difficulties in understanding as a barrier to integration: 
 
“They absolutely need to understand what engineers are talking about, so that they do 
need the basic man-machine interface training and a basic engineering understanding 
of how things work, because you just can't get on at all otherwise”. (Safety Engineer) 
 
Respondents sometimes referred to styles and modes of communication as ways of 
improving integration: 
 
“They should have a welcoming disposition towards them, as they have some 
valuable ideas to provide” (Domain Engineer) 
 
In some cases the ability of an individual to put over a point of view, particularly with 
managers was seen as advantageous: 
 
“it's good communication with the people that manage the project, and amongst 
different teams that were taking part in the project, and then really after that it often 
comes down to individuals as to how well it flows” (HF Subcontractor Safety 
Engineer) 
 
The problems involved in the nature of HF data, finding the right level of detail, as 
well as the difficulties in providing an unequivocal opinion relating to HF data were 
also mentioned as sometimes leading to communication problems 
 
“What you do find is that at a level of detail you get a lot of conflicting advice 
between various human factors experts, not even that, [it’s] more the priority or 
importance of an aspect.” (Safety Engineer) 
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Presenting data in a particular format was seen as facilitating translation across 
disciplinary boundaries:  
 
“If it’s something looking at a manual handling issue, then you need a pictorial sort 
of way to present that to the engineers …  and that's when it adds value.” (Human 
Factors Team Leader) 
 
   
4.3 HFI Barriers 
4.3.1 Attitudes towards HF 
The view that human factors was “common sense” was mentioned by a number of 
respondents as a significant barrier in establishing HF within projects: 
 
“Sometimes you don't feel valued because you are seen as common sense or an add 
on and some people are not open-minded enough to see that you can add value to 
their project.” (Human Factors Team Leader) 
 
In other cases, even where there was established support and enthusiasm for the work 
of the HF team, the view that HF was “just common sense” was still present amongst 
those outside of the team: 
 
“We used a human factors approach, using our expert to say, come on this is common 
sense, and in some respects this is the problem with human factors isn't it?  A lot of it 
is common sense, and a lot of that is quite clever in the design analysis technique. But 
some of it is common sense” (Head of Engineering) 
 
Another attitude that seemed to be common was that HF was a “tick box” activity, 
which should be carried out quickly and with a minimal of disruption: 
 
“You might have to design something that is almost ready to manufacture but then 
think ‘oh dear, I've got to tick the human factors box’, human factors will take a quick 
look at the design and then have quite a detailed look at the tool which could be quite 
useful, but from the designer's point of view, a waste of time as it also increases the 
time of the design process without even having any added benefit.” (Design Engineer) 
 
 
4.3.2 Knowledge and experience: engineering and human factors 
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Some respondents mentioned that there were occasions when there were tensions 
between engineers and the human factors team with regard to HF knowledge and 
expertise: 
 
“You get an attitude of ‘I did a module of this when I did systems engineering at 
university eight years ago’ so therefore, I know what I'm talking about, I'm not letting 
some human factors engineer tell me what my products or system should or shouldn't 
be.” (Human Factors Team Member) 
 
 
Likewise, there was also the view that the human factors team need more engineering 
knowledge and experience in order to work within projects: 
 
“I think the human factors team at the moment are purely ergonomists, I think I don't 
think that there are cross trained engineers or anything and I don’t think that’s 
entirely satisfactory.” (Domain Engineer) 
 
 
 
4.3.3 Costs and resources 
The perception that HF was costly and time consuming was mentioned by 
respondents a number of times: 
 
“When the organisation tries to avoid using human factors [it] is usually on cost and 
time scales, sometimes it's sort of internally; we get we get very detailed human 
factors assessments of work and sometimes that is seen as going over the top for what 
we need.” (Development Engineer) 
 
“I suppose in terms of cost cutting it might be seen as a soft add on.” (Safety Team 
Leader) 
 
Other resource issues, including time, the size and turnover within the team were also 
seen as having an impact upon integration activities: 
 
“Very few projects would think about human factors at the beginning, and would then 
try to say ‘I've got a human factors integration problem’ … rather than say you can't 
do everything because one, you don't have the resources, and two, you don't have the 
money, so what kind of key aspects do they need to focus on?” (Safety Engineer) 
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“Overall, the human factors team is quite small. So the people that do leave are the 
people that have come in and have had two or three years and have gone off to the 
next thing ... [that] gives the people managing the human factors issues trouble.” 
(Safety Engineer) 
 
 
4.4 HFI enablers 
4.4.1 Education and familiarisation courses 
Extending the knowledge of human factors amongst engineers, through 
familiarisation courses for example, was seen as an important mechanism for 
facilitating HFI within the company: 
 
“Give them a baseline understanding of what HF is, what the benefits of HF are and 
provide practical examples of how we can help…we’re doing that with a HF 
familiarization course for the designer safety engineers” (Human Factors Team 
Leader) 
 
“I think more familiarisation training is needed, and to have a basic engineering 
course, either in earlier employment or as part of their degree course, so they 
understand the factors involved and the benefits”. (Safety Engineer) 
 
Similar courses for the members of the HF team were also mentioned by respondents 
as filling in the missing gaps in their knowledge of engineering: 
 
“I do think that we should train everybody and give them [the human factors team] 
awareness training on these things, they don't all have to be practitioners, but 
engineering is a combination of different things in different elements.” (Head of 
Engineering) 
 
 
4.4.2 Organisational factors 
Raising the visibility of HF within the company and adopting a strategy of promoting 
the value of HF was seen by respondents as a key activity in enabling HFI: 
 
“… hit it with a two pronged approach. If you hit it at the very senior level (sort of the 
executive vice president of the businesses) and if you can get their buy in, then you 
have got the buy in of the boss. And then the trick is to also hit it at the lowest level, at 
the design, engineering level, at the coalface … then what you have is a sandwich 
effect. (Human Factors Team Member) 
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At the same time persistence and determination to get the message over was 
recognized as necessary: 
 
“If you don't take a positive attitude to actually keep propagating, promoting human 
factors [then] that will fly back to the back end again, and the challenge is to actually 
keep reminding people that they should take this into account.” (Safety Engineer) 
 
Part of the issue of raising the visibility of HF was seen an embedding the team within 
the organization and giving it an acknowledged status within the company: 
 
“We talked about making it a skill group in its own right and that will make it much 
more visible” (Head of Engineering) 
 
Defining the role of the team and relationship it had to other groups within the 
company was seen as helping towards greater visibility: 
 
“The challenge that they've got is to actually define what their proper role is, what is 
their proper scope of activities, where they are going to engage the business or 
strengths within the company … basically the challenge is to know what and how HF 
works in the company.” (Safety Engineer) 
 
Actively marketing and selling the value of HF internally was mentioned by 
respondents as an important mechanism for moving toward greater integration: 
 
“If  you can also give them the arguments and say can you afford not to do this?  … 
that is a good way to get people to buy into human factors and is obviously a good 
way to improve the relationships between the design people because they will 
understand better.” (Human Factors Team Member) 
 
Finally, improving the timing of exchange of information from the team and enduring 
effective communication were cited as examples of improvement strategies that could 
be adopted more widely within the company: 
 
 “I think it’s mainly communication, being very clear about what we're doing and it's 
giving a consistent message about what we can do and how we do it. You know trying 
to get it across to people that it's the not just subjective and that we do have good 
processes that guide what we do, and kind of align the way in which they work on it 
as well” (HF Subcontractor Safety Engineer) 
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5. Discussion 
The findings from the interviews with HF and other personnel within the company 
could be said to be typical of the types of problems we might have expected to be find 
amongst HF practitioners working within an industrial or commercial context. 
Comparing our results with previous work carried out on the barriers that exist to HFI 
demonstrates that many attitudes and perceptions (e.g., that HF is “common sense” 
and costly) are as prevalent today as they were twenty-five years ago (Meister, 1982a, 
b; Perrow, 1983, Figure 1). One of the most interesting features of the findings are the 
range of improvement strategies used by the HF team in order to deal with the barriers 
to HFI they encountered in their work. The company culture, communication 
problems and misunderstandings about the functioning and purpose of the team acted 
together as a hindrance to collaboration with other groups. In the terms of the 
framework described in section 2 of the paper, the HF team employed a number of 
strategies and tactics in order to improve perceptions of their performance by other 
groups in the company, as well as strengthen the degree to which collaborations were 
viable and sustainable over time (figure 2) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 about here 
 
 
 
 
The improvement strategies employed by the HF team in many cases involved them 
actively trying to break through barriers with other groups. In a number of cases this 
meant actively trying to adopt the perspective or tap into the “mindset” of engineering 
groups within the company. In other cases it meant modifying the way in which they 
presented, or “translated”, data to these groups by presenting it in different formats 
(e.g., presenting quantitative data in a pictorial format). Many of the strategies 
involved improvements to communications between the groups, as well as actively 
championing and promoting the value of HF. 
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The attempts by the HF team to improve HFI in the company share similarities with 
other research on the behaviour of newly introduced or minority groups within 
organisations. Ancona and Caldwell (1990) for example, found that faced with the 
challenge of raising their profile within a large organisation, new product 
development teams engaged in a number of boundary management activities. These 
included setting up roles such as “team ambassador” (e.g., representing the team to 
other groups, “talking the team up” in order to obtain outside resources) and “team co-
ordinator” (e.g., communicating laterally with other groups, discussing problems with 
them and gaining feedback on team progress). Within the HF team these types of roles 
were not set up in such a formal manner, however, they could serve as the basis from 
which to consider further improvements to HFI within the company.  
  
5.1 Implications and lessons for HFI 
The study sheds light on an area of investigation that has involved a great deal of 
discussion and debate over the last few years. Much of this discussion has been driven 
by methods and tools to narrow the gap between HF personnel and their system 
development counterparts. The case study we have described provides some further 
insights into the “softer”, more process-oriented aspects of HFI and shows that there 
are a range of social and organisational strategies that similar HF teams can adopt 
when attempting to establish better and more productive working relationships with 
groups from other disciplines. The framework in particular, might serve as a basis 
with which to plan and evaluate team-based improvement strategies. It could be used 
for example, to structure discussions centred around gaps in skills and knowledge and 
other consider options for internal changes to the working of the HF team. Many of 
the improvement strategies, alongside lessons learnt from other contexts involving 
boundary management between organisational groups (e.g., Ancona and Caldwell, 
1990), might provide other HF teams in similar settings with ideas and interventions 
designed to improve HFI.  
 
5.2 Limitations and future work 
The small sample size of our study may well limit the extent to which it generalises to 
other HFI contexts. Similarly, we examined HFI as it applies within the context of the 
defence industry, a domain in which HFI shares many similarities with other domains, 
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but most likely operates in a different manner. Nevertheless, the fact that our findings 
chime with those obtained in both the defence and other types of industries leads us to 
have some confidence in their ability to generalise. Future work need to be carried out 
in order to evaluate the framework and to explore further types of barriers and 
improvement strategies that may play a more important role in other contexts. 
Another line of research that could be explored is tracking the development of 
changes to attitudes and perceptions, alongside social and organisational 
developments over a longer period of time. This types of research has yielded 
important insights within other types of industrial contexts and projects (e.g., software 
engineering – Walz et al., 1993; Waterson et al., 1997). In our future work we plan to 
add in a later data collection phase to the study and compare our findings with those 
described in the present study in order to see how the process of HFI develops over 
time. 
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Table 1: Study participants and experience 
Role Company experience 
Human Factors Team Members  
HF Team Member 2 years 
HF Team Member 6 years 
HF Team Leader 8 years 
HF Subcontractor Safety Engineer 4 months 
Safety Personnel  
Safety Case Manager 11 years  
Safety Team Leader 30 years 
Safety Assessment Subcontractor 15 years 
Safety Engineer 20 years 
Safety Engineer 8 years 
Safety Engineer 15 years 
Safety Engineer 25 years 
Safety Assessment Subcontractor 2 years 
Engineering Personnel  
Senior Design Engineer 9 years  
Design Engineer 4 years 
Technical Engineer 18 years 
Development Engineer 22 years 
Design Engineer 3 years 
Head of Engineering 35 years 
Design Engineer 15 years 
Domain Engineer 13 years 
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Table 2: Coding framework 
Work of the HF Team Type of involvement Mandatory involvement 
(“pull”) 
  Informal request for 
involvement 
  Internal consulting 
(providing expertise) 
  Suggesting involvement 
(“push”) 
  Information provision 
 Role Ownership 
  Risk management 
  Viewpoint (overview) 
 Role conflicts Educational background 
and experience 
Social and organisational 
influences on HFI 
Company culture Lack of HF visibility 
  Integration 
 Relationships  Relationship building 
  Changes over time 
  Establishing a rapport 
 Personalities Individuals 
 Integration Integrated working 
 Learning  Mutual learning 
 Nature of the relationship Positive 
  Negative 
 Communication Conflicts 
  Data incompatibilities 
  Style of communication 
  Level of detail from HF 
HFI Barriers Attitudes towards HF Common sense 
  Tick box ticking 
 Gaps in knowledge and 
experience 
Cultural clashes 
  Assumptions of 
knowledge 
 Costs and resources Expense of HF input 
  Lack of adequate resources 
  Experience and age of 
team 
  Turnover and size 
 Late involvement Late 
HFI Facilitators Improvement strategies Education 
  Use of examples 
 Organisational factors Visibility 
  Selling HF 
  Communication 
  Defining role 
 Timing Handover and timing 
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Figure 1: A framework for understanding the social and organisational aspects of HFI 
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Figure 2: Social and organisational aspects of HFI: Barriers and improvement strategies 
 
 
 
